This paper focuses on dynamic output feedback control of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Firstly, by analyzing the different effects of DoS attacks on the sensorto-controller (S-C) channel and the controller-to-actuator(C-A) channel respectively, a switching system modeling method for the dynamic output feedback CPS is presented. Considering the bandwidth of the two channels is different and the energy limitation of the attacker, it is fair to assume that an attacker can only jam one communication channel at each time step and the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks is bounded. Secondly, according to a packet-based transmission scheme, a nested switching model considering both the spatial variability and the temporal persistence of DoS attacks is constructed on the basis of the switching system. Then, the exponential stability condition of the dynamic output feedback CPS is obtained, and a controller design method based on linear matrix inequality is proposed. Finally, a simulation example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded technology, computer technology and automatic control technology have developed vigorously and crossed each other in recent years, which make control, communication and computation highly integrated, and build a bridge between the information world and the physical world, thus promoting the development of Cyber-Physical System (CPS). In recent years, CPS has become a hot issue in the scientific and industrial circles. It has been widely used in industrial production [1] , intelligent city [2] , intelligent transportation [3] , power grid [4] . In CPS, the deep integration of information space and physical space brings important technological advantages, but at the same time, attackers may invade physical space by attacking information space, and then destroy the latter arbitrarily. The degree of damage and the high-risk coefficient are often unexpected by CPS designers and managers. For example, in 2015, hackers attacked Ukraine's power system using malware called BlackEnergy, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Luis Javier Garcia Villalba . resulting in massive blackouts [5] . In 2017, WannaCry's blackmail software virus infected more than 230,000 computers worldwide [6] . Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the security control of CPS.
At present, in view of the control security of CPS under information attacks, related research mainly considers DoS attacks, replay attacks, false data injection and so on. Among them, DoS attacks are the most harmful and easy to implement, which usually send a large number of data on the network. According to this, the network is busy with processing these meaningless data and thus unable to respond to normal service requests. DoS attacks, as one of the main security problems faced by CPS, have always been the key research direction of relevant scholars, and there have been many research results. Foroush et al. [7] design control and trigger strategies to detect attack cycles when only the upper bound of attack time is limited. By properly configuring closed-loop poles, the stability of the system is guaranteed under DoS attacks with unknown periods. When the DoS attacks develop into a Markov process model, the problem of finding the optimal control strategy is considered, and the optimal control strategy is given in [8] . From the attacker's point of view, a DoS attacks scheme based on DoS attack schedule is proposed to maximize the average covariance trace of Kalman estimator in [9] . Furthermore, considering the interaction between the attacker and the system, the game approach is used in [10] - [12] . In [10] , a class of control system model and security problems with known states and limited attack time is described. The concept of resilient control system design is first introduced in [13] . The resilient containment control for discrete-time multiagent systems subject to packet dropouts is concerned in [14] . Feng and Tesi [15] design an resilient controller based on the robustness of the system. A new Event-triggered resilient control strategy for CPS with interference and measurement noise under dual-channel asynchronous DoS attacks is proposed in [16] . Two different event-triggering mechanisms are designed for S-C channel and C-A channel. [17] uses state feedback control when dealing with packet dropouts caused by DoS attacks. However, the state of the system is not always measurable. By using dynamic output feedback control, the state of the controlled system can be obtained, and the related dynamic output feedback H∞ control problem is studied in [18] . Based on the event trigger mechanism, [19] and [20] discuss nonlinear observer-based output feedback control.
Although security control problems under DoS attacks have been studied in the existing literatures [21] , [22] , there are still many problems that have not been effectively solved so far. In particular, how to describe more accurately the impact of attacks on system performance is one of the challenging issues. In [23] , attack intensity and threshold are chosen to describe the relationship between the attackers and the system performance, and the necessary and sufficient conditions of Nash equilibrium are analyzed under a two-stage game model. However, under the interference of intelligent attackers, the system needs to passively select the optimal detection threshold corresponding to the attack intensity, and can not actively compensate for packet dropouts induced by DoS attacks. Yuan et al. [24] discuss the flexible control based on switching system method, and propose a hybrid theoretical framework in which the controller will switch in accordance with the competing result of the cyber attacker and defender. However, this classification method does not consider the impact of DoS attacks on different communication channels of the system fundamentally.
Based on the above discussion, the objective of this paper is to design a dynamic output feedback controller to tackle the DoS attacks problem for CPS. Different from the general classification of switching subsystems, according to the characteristics of continuous DoS attacks, we consider not only the impact of DoS attacks on different communication channels of CPS, but also the duration of DoS attacks. In fact, in view of this situation, the controller can be designed more effectively, so that a series of predicted future control inputs can compensate for the state of CPS under DoS attacks. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as: 
1) Considering the spatial and temporal characteristics of
DoS attacks, the CPS under DoS attacks is modeled as a two-stage nested switching system, and the dynamic evolution between two adjacent transmission switching points is given. 2) By use of the proposed nested switching system model, the exponential stability of CPS under DoS attacks is discussed, and the designed dynamic output feedback controller can be used to give a series of future control inputs for the successful transmission time of packets. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, A two-stage nested switching system is proposed to describe the situation of consecutive DoS attacks on S-C or C-A channels of CPS. In Section III, stability condition for the CPS under DoS attacks is studied. Meanwhile, the packet-based dynamic output feedback controller against DoS attacks is designed. The following Section IV shows the numerical simulations to verify the given results. The last Section V concludes this paper.
Notation: R n is the n-dimensional Euclidean space. x represents the 2-norm of the vector x. For a matrix A, τ max (A) (τ min (A)) is the largest (smallest) singular value of A, A > 0 (A < 0) is a positive (negative) definite matrix, A T is the transposition of A. The symbol * within a matrix represents the symmetric term.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
According to the different occurrences of DoS attacks on the S-C channel and the C-A channel, the structure of CPS considered in this paper is shown in Fig. 1 .
The controlled plant of CPS is described by the following linear discrete-time system model:
where x (k) ∈ R n is the state vector; u (k) ∈ R m is the control input; A, B and C are known constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. Then the dynamic output feedback controller is adopted as
where x c (k) ∈ R q is the state vector of controller, F, G and H are unknown matrices with appropriate dimensions. In Fig. 1 , VOLUME 7, 2019 switch T 1 and switch T 2 are used to indicate the packet dropouts of S-C channel and C-A channel when the system is attacked, respectively. When T 1 is closed, it represents that there are no DoS attacks on S-C channel, and then y (k) is successfully transferred to the controller, w (k) = y (k); When T 1 is open, it represents that DoS attacks on S-C channel and y (k) can not be successfully transmitted to the controller. At this time, the controller maintains the input of the previous moment,
The maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks launched by the attacker is bounded, denoted by N . And an attacker can only jam one communication channel of CPS through DoS attacks at each time step.
Remark 2: In fact, considering the persistence of DoS attacks, packet dropout on the S-C or A-C channel will occur continuously in multiple sampling periods. And because the attacker has energy constraints [25] , the attacker may quickly exhaust energy. It is reasonable to consider that the number of consecutive DoS attacks is bounded. For bounded DoS attacks, when an attacker can achieve the goal after attacking a single channel, it is usually unnecessary to attack two channels at the same time.
Let
the above analysis, we can see that there are three kinds of situations in which DoS attacks affect closed-loop CPS. The following three cases are analyzed, and the closed-loop CPS model in each case is given. S 1 : No DoS attacks on S-C and C-A channels
S 2 : DoS attacks on S-C channel
From the above analysis, we can see that in any sampling period, the closed-loop system model is one of the three cases mentioned above. Therefore, the CPS under DoS attacks can be described by a time-switching system model with three subsystems as
where σ (k) ∈ M = {1, 2, 3} is a piecewise continuous function, which is called subsystem switching signal. Subsystem S 2 describes the system model in which the measured output is lost under DoS attacks, while subsystem S 3 describes the system model in which the output of the controller is lost under DoS attacks. Therefore, any output feedback controller (2) can not change the dynamics of subsystems S 2 and S 3 .
In order to keep CPS stable under DoS attacks, the main idea of using the control method in [26] for reference is based on each received measurement signal. The controller not only calculates the current control input, but also calculates a series of future control input, which is encapsulated into a data package and transmitted to the actuator. Finally, the executor chooses the appropriate control input according to the different impact of DoS attack on the network environment. The difference is that this paper more fully considers the impact of DoS attacks on S-C and C-A channels respectively. Further, since the system state is generally difficult to obtain in practice, the introduction of dynamic output feedback controller is more practical than [26] . Thus, the system (3) can be further described as
where k t (k t ∈ R, t ∈ R) denotes the normal transmission time of packets on two channels and is defined as the trans-
represents the number of consecutive DoS attacks initiated at time k t +1 (if σ (k t ) = 1, it means that there are no DoS attacks and τ σ (k t ) (k t ) = 0). And based on Assumption 1, if σ (k t ) = 2 or σ (k t ) = 3, the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks is N . The relationship between two adjacent transmission switching points can be obtained as follow:
Furthermore, the relationship between the evolution of the system state corresponding to two adjacent transmission switching points depending on the number of consecutive DoS attacks can be described as follows. S 1,0 : No DoS attacks on S-C and C-A channels
S 2,n : The number of consecutive DoS attacks on S-C channel is n (n ∈ L, n > 0)
. . . 
. . .
From observation, it can be found that the evolution of system dynamics between two adjacent transmission switching points can be represented by the following nested switching system model:
where τ σ (k t ) (k t ) is a transmission switching signal as defined in (5) . Considering that the nested switching system model (9) can only describe the system state at the transmission switching points, it is necessary to study the time point of packet dropout in order to comprehensively analyze the stability of the whole system. We represent the state vector between two adjacent transmission switching points z (k t ) and z (k t+1 ) as z k j,t .The subscript j ∈ L is determined by the DoS attacks occurring at time k = k t + 1, and z (k t + j) = z k j,t k t < k j,t < k t+1 . Obviously, the state vectors of CPS satisfy {z (k)} = {z (k t )} ∪ z k j,t . In order to more clearly explain the relationship between time series k, k t and k j,t and the evolution mode of equations (7) and (8), Fig. 2 describes the Nested switching model caused by data packets dropout. In fact, subsystem S i,n is located between two adjacent transmission switching points, and its model is established depending on the number of consecutive DoS attacks.
III. STABILITY ANALYSIS AND CONTROLLER DESIGN
In this section, two Theorems and an Algorithm are provided for stability and stabilization of the studied CPS with the DoS attacks. In Section A, under the nested switching system model, which combines subsystem switching signals and transmission switching signals, Theorem 5 is provided to judge the stability of the CPS. In Section B, Under the given conditions of exponentially stable, Theorem 6 is used to solve the gain matrix of the controller, Algorithm 1 is given to solve the nonlinear minimization problem.
In [27] , by establishing the switching relationship between stable and unstable uncertain nonlinear subsystems, a switching-type adaptive estimator is designed and the stability of the closed-loop system is analyzed. Furthermore, [27] and [28] consider the influence of average dwell time and switching period on the stability of the switched system. Based on the different communication channels, this paper makes a more detailed division of the unstable subsystem. This increases the complexity of the switching system, but due to the introduction of the transmission switching point, this paper does not need to consider the impact of the average dwell time and the switching period when analyzing the stability of CPS. For convenience of the development, the following definition and lemma are given.
Definition 3: The system (1) is said to exponentially stable and has exponential decay rate λ, if there are positive scalars c and λ < 1 such that the solution x (k) of system (1) satisfying
where x (0) ∈ R n is an arbitrary initial value.
Lemma 4: For an arbitrary matrix F ∈ R n×n and an arbitrary vector x ∈ R n , the following inequality α n x ≤ Fx ≤ α 1 x , holds, where α 1 and α n are the maximum singular value and the minimum singular value of F, respectively [29] .
A. STABILITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 5: For some given scalars ε i,n > 1, µ > 1, the CPS (1) is exponentially stable with the decay rate
L is a finite set which depends on the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks, and if i = 1, n can only be equal to 0), such that
Proof: Choose the following piecewise continuous Lyapunov function for system (9) :
where the subscript τ σ (k t ) (k t ) indicates that the Lyapunov function corresponds to the nested subsystem σ (k t ) = i (i ∈ M ), τ σ (k t ) (k t ) = n (n ∈ L), while the subsystem τ σ (k t ) (k t ) = n is located between the transmission switching points k t and k t+1 . Further, consider the subsystems of system (9):
Choose the following Lyapunov function for subsystems (14):
By defining ξ (k t ) = ε t i,n z (k t ), the following system models can be derived from (14):
Choose the following Lyapunov function for system (16) :
Then along any trajectory of the system (16), the first order forward difference of W i,n (k t ) is
Further, from Schur complement lemma, we can see that i,n < 0 is equivalent to matrix inequality (10) . Notice that
Then it is derived from (11) that
Taking (17) and (19) into account yields that
where ρ = max ε −2 i,n µ i ∈ M , n ∈ L . Since ρ < 1, V τ σ (k t ) (k t ) (k t ) will converge to zero as t → ∞. According to (13) , z (k t ) will also converge to zero as t → ∞. In order to prove the convergence of the whole system, not only the state sequence {z (k t )} but also the state sequence z k j,t should be considered. From Lemma 4, each z k j,t has the following relationship with z (k t ):
where λ = max τ max K i,n i = 1, 2, 3; n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1}. It is known from (21) that state sequence z k j,t will also converge to zero as t → ∞. From the above analysis, we can see that the state sequence {z (k)} tends to zero as t → ∞, i.e., the system (9) is stable at any transmission switching rate. It is obtained from (13) , (20) and Lemma 4 that
Thus
where θ 1 = min ε min P i,n , θ 2 = max ε max P i,n , i ∈ M , n ∈ L. Then it is derived from (21) and (23) that
For the CPS transmission strategy considered in this paper, k t , k j,t and t have the following relations:
Therefore, according to (23)- (25) and ρ < 1, we have
From (26) and (27), for any time after a transmission switching point, the following inequality
holds. There will be at least N successful transmission points of packets in N (N + 1) time steps, which are the transmission switching points defined in this paper. According to Definition 3, it is obtained from (12) and (28) that the CPS (1) will be exponentially stable after finite time steps. And it can be seen from condition (12) that the exponential decay rate 2(N +2) √ ρ is related to the values of parameter ε i,n and µ. For the given µ, the larger the ε i,n is, the faster the subsystem will converge. The proof is completed.
B. DESIGN OF CONTROLLER
Theorem 6: For some given scalars ε i,n > 1, µ > 1, if there exist matrices P i,n , Y n , Q i,n > 0, Q i,n = P −1 i,n (i ∈ M , n ∈ L, L is a finite set which depends on the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks, and if i = 1, n can only be equal to 0), such that the following inequalities
3 represent subsystems S 2 , S 3 respectively. For any switching rate, the system (1) is exponentially stable with the decay rate 2(N +2) √ ρ under the output feedback controller with gain matrix Y n .
Proof: According to Theorem 5, inequality (10) is a non-linear matrix inequality. Pre-and post-multiplying the inequality (10) by diag I , P −1 i,n , obtained (10) is equivalent to the following matrix inequality:
The expressions of K i,n in (6), (7) and (8) are substituted into (32) leads to
where Q i,n = P −1 i,n . Notice that A i,n can be written as
Matrix inequalities (29) can be obtained from (33). This completes the proof. By using cone complementary linearization (CCL) method [30] , the output feedback controller can be designed by solving the following nonlinear minimization problem with linear matrix inequality constraints. 
the constraint (35) is given by the following inequalitiesz:
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm for Feasible Solution step 1: Set n = 0, the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks is N . step 2: Select the appropriate parameter ε i,n . step3: If n = 0, find a set of feasible solutions for inequalities (30), (31) and (35). Otherwise, find a set of feasible solutions for inequalities (30) , (31) and (37). Record the feasible solution as (P 0 i,n , Q 0 i,n , Y 0 n ). Set k = 0. step 4: If n = 0, then i = 1. Solve the following LMIs problem: min Tr P k i,n Q i,n + Q k i,n P i,n , s.t. 
n , an appropriate step ε i,n is added to ε i,n , set ε i,n = ε i,n + ε i,n and return to step 3. If (29) is not satisfied within a specified number of iterations, set ε i,n = ε i,n − ε i,n , and take Y n as the final controller gain matrix, then set n = n + 1, and return to step 2. Otherwise, set k = k + 1 and return to step 4. 
the constraint (37) is given by the following inequalities:
where i = 1, 2, n = 1, 2, · · · , N . Further, the following iterative Algorithm can be used to solve the nonlinear minimization problems (34) and (36). Remark 7: The calculation of A T i,1 · · · A T i,n−1 A T i,n in (37) follows the steps of the proposed iterative algorithm. When it is necessary to calculate A i,N , both A i,N −1 , · · · , A i,1 , A 1,0 have been calculated and can be substituted into (37). Then, the CPS only needs to select the corresponding controller parameters according to the current network environment to compensate the lost packets.
Noting that the computation complexity of the proposed method will increase as the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks increases. In order to compensate for packet loss caused by DoS attacks, the CPS does not know and does not need to know the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks in advance. The controller parameters designed in this paper are calculated one by one, and the controller parameters calculated first can be used to calculate the later controller parameters.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Consider the cart and inverted pendulum problem in Fig. 3 . If DoS attacks are on the C-A channel, the measurement output will be lost. The controller maintains the input of the previous period and sends a series of control sequences to the actuator through the network after calculating them. If DoS attacks are on the S-C channel, the control output will be lost and the executor maintains the input of the previous period. Suppose that the three switching subsystems S 1 , S 2 and S 3 considered in this paper occur within the time interval [0, 50T ).
In the simulation, it is considered the maximum number of consecutive DoS attacks is N = 3. Set the maximum number of iterations to 50 and run iteration algorithm 1, When µ = 1.05, ε 1,0 = 1.43, ε 2,1 = ε 3,1 = 1.12, ε 2,2 = ε 3,2 = 1.15 and ε 2,3 = ε 3,3 = 1.19, the possible DoS attack pattern is described by seven subsystems. The gain matrices of four groups of controllers can be obtained as follows: controller designed by Theorem 6 without DoS attack. When DoS attacks conform to the attack sequence shown in Fig. 5 , the state trajectories of CPS using a controller designed based on Theorem 6 are shown by Fig. 6. Fig. 7 shows the non-uniform DoS attacks. Under such an attack sequence, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the state trajectories of CPS with and without nested switching system method, respectively. Then, it is observed from Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 that the controller based on Theorem 6 can achieve better convergence. In this sense, when the maximum number of continuous DoS attacks is bounded, the proposed dynamic output feedback control method based on nested switching system can guarantee the stability of CPS. It is worth noting that, since the transmission rule in this paper is not used, the state trajectories in Fig. 9 fluctuate greatly near the 45th sampling time. This is because DoS attacks can have a greater impact on the C-A channel, and the C-A channel is jammed for a long time before the 45th sampling time.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the dynamic output feedback method is used to solve the security control problem for CPS under DoS attacks. In view of the possibility of DoS attacks on different communication channels of CPS, CPS is modeled as a switching system with three subsystems. Furthermore, according to the persistence and energy limitation of DoS attacks, a control method for nested switching system during DoS attacks is designed. On this basis, the exponential stability of CPS is analyzed, and the controller gain matrix is obtained by the given iterative algorithm. Finally, a simulation example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. In the future, we will fully consider the intelligence of attackers in the system model. The game strategy of physical layer and cyber layer will be introduced, on this basis, a resilient controller will be designed to ensure the safety of CPS.
